3 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
claude-timemachine	7c9d33f952	feat(sync): wire state.json + divergence detection + dialogs ... state.py: per-instance sync state. <pack>/.cloud-sync/state.json (mode 600) records last_pulled_snapshot_id + last_pulled_at + host_tag. Versioned schema. clear() on remote-empty. sync.pull decision tree (replaces the unconditional restore): no token file → prompt_login_qt; on Skip return 0 (don't block launch) no state + remote empty → no-op no state + remote non-empty → restore (first-run on this machine) state.id == remote.id → skip restore (up to date) state.id != remote.id, no in-scope local edits since state.at → restore (fast-forward) state.id != remote.id, in-scope local edits since state.at → prompt_conflict_qt keep_local → don't restore; push will overwrite cloud use_remote → restore + update state cancel → exit 1 sync.push: --json output parsed for snapshot_id; state.json updated to that id after a successful backup. Skips silently if no token. _find_modified_in_scope: walks include roots, filters via _matches_any (restic-style globs: dir/, **/dir/, **/*.glob). Stops at 50 hits; we only need 'any' + a sample for the dialog. _format_dt: hand-rolled (no GNU-vs-Windows strftime quirks) → 'Thursday, October 21, 2021 at 7:12 PM'. Restic JSON parsing helpers: _parse_snapshots, _parse_restic_time (handles nanosecond precision), _parse_backup_summary. tests/test_state.py: 19 new tests covering state read/write, scope- aware mtime walk, exclude glob matching, restic output parsers. Total: 52 green.	2026-06-05 00:20:40 +02:00
claude-timemachine	49d1cb3280	drop restic repo encryption; rely on TLS + append-only + LUKS ... User credentials now serve HTTP basic auth only. Repos init with --insecure-no-password. Removes: - RESTIC_PASSWORD env in client subprocess - Per-repo password coordination story - Multi-key restic setup (user key + operator-master key) - Two-password recovery edge cases Operator-side prune now runs over the filesystem path (-r /srv/.../<user>/) which bypasses rest-server's HTTP-layer append-only enforcement. No password needed at all. Protection model stays: - TLS in transit (reverse proxy) - HTTP basic per-user (htpasswd) for read/write authorization - --private-repos for per-user URL isolation - --append-only for client-side delete protection - LUKS / disk-level for at-rest encryption (operator's responsibility) Verified end-to-end on john: pull → push → restore round-trip works, DELETE on bogus snapshot still returns 403 (append-only intact), operator can read repo via filesystem path (prune-mode access works). 33 pytest still green.	2026-06-04 22:23:40 +02:00
claude-timemachine	ffdfb1f9b6	pivot to Python: replace Kotlin/JVM with stdlib zipapp ... Reasons stacked up: - AV: unsigned JARs that auto-download binaries + upload files trigger Windows Defender false-positives more often than Python scripts invoked by code-signed python.exe. - Qt UI option: PySide6 opens a path to a real Qt UI (matching Prism's look) if needed later. JVM Qt bindings are abandoned. - frazclient already needs Python; inlining as 'import cloud_sync' is zero overhead vs the launcher always shelling out to java. Implementation: - cloud_sync package: cli.py (argparse), creds.py, scope.py, restic.py (binary discovery + auto-download + sha256 verify), sync.py (pull/push subprocess restic). - pyproject.toml with hatchling backend; pip-installable. - Makefile builds cloud-sync.pyz via python -m zipapp (~53 KB). - 33 pytest tests, stdlib only on runtime. - CI workflow runs pytest matrix (3.10/3.11/3.12) + builds pyz. - DESIGN.md + README.md updated to reflect Python. E2E verified against local restic-rest-server: pull empty → push initial → rm -rf local → pull restores → modify+push creates second snapshot → client forget --prune blocked by --append-only. Throws away ~565 LOC of Kotlin (and 18 jar tests) committed earlier in this same session. Net result is ~250 LOC Python + 33 tests = smaller and more aligned with the rest of the stack.	2026-06-03 01:11:47 +02:00